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A VARIABLE NUMBER OF CHEERS FOR VIEWPOINT-
BASED REGULATIONS OF SPEECH 
R. George Wright* 
INTRODUCTION 
If there is one thing we think we know about the First Amendment, it is 
that speech restrictions based on viewpoint are especially objectionable.  The 
Supreme Court has declared that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”1  For this proposition, the Court has on one occasion cited 
thirteen of its own precedents.2 
Much more broadly, the Court has also held that a government “has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”3  Focusing more specifically, though, on viewpoint-based 
restrictions, the Court has declared that “[g]overnment discrimination 
among viewpoints—or the regulation of speech based on ‘the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker’—is a ‘more 
blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content discrimination.’”4 
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 * Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
 1 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (political flag desecration case). 
 2 See id.  The cases cited begin with the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
case of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988), extending historically to 
the “red flag” display case of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1931). 
 3 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (public sign restriction case); see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762–63 (2017)) 
(trademark registration context); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 
(1991); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
 4 Reed, 576 U.S. at 168 (quoting the university speech subsidy case of Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).  In Reed, Justice Breyer, who is 
often prone to engage in proportionalist interest balancing, refers to viewpoint-
discrimination as “a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule.”  Reed, 
576 U.S. at 178 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 182 (Kagan, J., 
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However clear these statements may seem, they immediately raise various 
problems of substance.  Merely for example, is there any constitutionally 
significant difference between prohibiting the expression of an idea entirely, 
and merely restricting, in some contexts, the expression of that idea, perhaps 
well short of complete prohibition?5  Can viewpoint regulation ever be 
motivated, to any degree, by any concern other than for the offensiveness or 
disagreeableness of the regulated idea itself?6  What about the regulation of 
speech the government actually endorses on the merits, but fears is premature 
for public discussion?7  Or what if a government that is quite sympathetic to 
the idea in question but fears the uncontrollable consequences of a disruptive 
“heckler’s veto” responds to the prospective speech?8  If the “hecklers” and 
their sympathizers comprise only a very small fraction of all interested 
persons, could they still qualify as the critical “society?”9  And what if the 
government is again indeed sympathetic to the restricted idea, but believes 
that the idea’s current dominance should be tested by legally advantaging, to 
some limited degree, its minority, dissenting, or less well-funded critics?10 
The idea that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are distinctively 
“egregious”11 also conceals a split between those who think of viewpoint-based 
 
concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a rule of “strict scrutiny,” as distinct from an 
absolute prohibition, in all cases of facial discrimination “on the basis of viewpoint”); Matal, 
137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 5 Thus, the idea of “silencing” is ambiguous between suppression in only one or 
more contexts or occasions, and a more thorough suppression.  Note the reference to 
prohibition in the Johnson flag burning case, 491 U.S. at 414; see also Nat’l Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 600–01 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 6 See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397; Finley, 524 U.S. 569.  Note also the distinction between 
viewpoint restriction and viewpoint discrimination.  There may be a sense in which equally 
restricting all viewpoints could equally and severely burden all viewpoints, but without also 
discriminating against any viewpoint.  “Discriminating” equally against all possible 
viewpoints would undermine freedom of speech, but perhaps without discriminating 
against, or treating unequally, any particular viewpoint.  For a much broader and 
sophisticated treatment, see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter?  Viewpoint Neutrality 
and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 320–25 (1997). 
 7 A regulating government might thus decide that public discussion of its own 
ultimate aims would, for the present, be inexpedient. 
 8 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (invalidating a law that 
“permitted conviction of petitioner” for speech that “stirred people to anger, invited public 
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest”); R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto 
Today, 68 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 159 (2017). 
 9 The anticipated “hecklers” could, after all, be not only small in numbers, but 
politically relatively powerless as well. 
 10 Regulating the expression of the clearly dominant viewpoint, for the sake of a more 
level playing field, might be thought not merely to “equalize” speech, but to enhance 
meaningful free speech, overall, on the topic in question.  For background in a related 
context, see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 
(1976). 
 11 See supra text accompanying note 4; see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 
(2019) (“The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or 
opinions it conveys.”  Viewpoint discrimination amounts to an “‘egregious form of content 
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regulations as absolutely illegitimate and irredeemable,12 and those who 
would merely apply some form of strict judicial scrutiny to such regulations.13  
This dispute between judicial absolutism and a merely presumptive judicial 
scrutiny of viewpoint-based restrictions requires some explanation. 
One obvious such explanation would point to the common14 assumption 
that viewpoint-based restrictions, as a category, are uniformly and uniquely 
egregious, or especially constitutionally harmful.15  But as illustrated below, 
this assumption is fundamentally mistaken.16 
 
discrimination’ that is [however, only] ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’” (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995))); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 436 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Viewpoint discrimination is 
thus an egregious form of content discrimination.  The government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or the perspective 
of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (quoting Rosenberger, 519 U.S. at 828–
29)); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone 
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 69 (2007) (“[T]he most universally 
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression [is] . . . suppression based on the 
regulator’s subjective disagreement with or disdain for the views being expressed.”). 
 12 See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (noting how 
in a traditional public forum, “restrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and 
those based on viewpoint are prohibited”); see also Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299; Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Redish, supra 
note 11, at 109 (“What should not—and for the most part, has not been the subject of 
serious dispute is that regulation of expression that is grounded in nothing more than 
governmental hostility to the normative viewpoint to be expressed is unqualifiedly 
unconstitutional.  There can be no exceptions to the constitutional bar of viewpoint-based 
regulations—at least in the context of coercive regulations and prohibitions.” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 111 (“The absoluteness of the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint 
discrimination flows from the unique harm that such regulations necessarily cause to the 
foundations of free expression.” (emphasis added)).  For commentary, see Robert C. Post, 
Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 169–72 (2007); Eric 
Heinze, Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech, 69 MOD. L. REV. 543, 546 (2006).  More 
broadly, see Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint 
Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity, 43 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 37 (2019). 
 13 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 182 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“[W]hen the restriction ‘raises the specter that the Government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace’—we insist that the law 
pass the most demanding constitutional test.” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 386 (1992))); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.  There seems to be a consensus that 
viewpoint-based, but not other content-based restrictions of speech, are prohibited in so-
called non-public government owned fora.  See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 
226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 14 Except in the context of government-owned speech fora, as noted in Summum, 555 
U.S. at 469–70, and in Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 237. 
 15 See the authorities cited supra notes 4, 11, 12. 
 16 See infra Part I. 
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Crucially, viewpoint-based restrictions take on a wide range of quite 
diverse forms.17  These diverse forms of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech 
also vary widely in the nature and severity of any threat they pose to freedom 
of speech, or to the basic values underlying freedom of speech.18  So diverse 
and variable are the forms of viewpoint-based restrictions that any general rule 
of strict scrutiny in all such cases,19 much less any absolute prohibition 
thereof,20 makes little constitutional sense.21 
Consider a bare typology of viewpoint-based restrictions, postponing any 
clarification and any examples.  Thus consider first a viewpoint-based 
restriction of speech that we might well indeed think of as “egregious.”  This 
form of viewpoint-based restriction might involve a governmental attempt at 
dictatorial repression.22  Of course, few governments rest their viewpoint-
based restrictions on a self-serving will to power alone.  In the American 
constitutional context, viewpoint-based speech restrictions are normally 
claimed to be justified by reference to some sort of affirmative public value.23  
Thus even clear cases of viewpoint-based speech restriction will normally 
involve some degree of mixed-motive justification,24 in which the prominence 
of any legitimate justifications will vary.  And in such cases, the severity of the 
speech-burden on regulated parties and audiences will also vary.25 
But not all instances of viewpoint-based restrictions will be clearly 
identifiable as such, or even intended to be viewpoint-based.  Thus there will 
be dubious cases in which the courts and the restricting government itself fail 
to acknowledge, or even recognize, the viewpoint-based elements of the 
speech restriction in question.26  These cases may well overlap with the many 
kinds of cases in which the viewpoint restriction actually does not reflect the 
substantive, first-order policy views of the restricting government itself.27 
There are cases in which a government policy should, realistically, be 
treated as a viewpoint-based restriction, even though the policy does not itself 
refer to viewpoint, and where again no viewpoint bias may have been 
intended.28  On the other hand, there are also cases of formal or explicit 
viewpoint restriction with only a trivial actual constitutional impact on the 
relevant speakers, in light of the quality of their remaining realistically 
available alternative speech channels.29 
 
 17 See infra Part I. 
 18 See infra Part I. 
 19 See the authorities cited supra note 13. 
 20 See the authorities cited supra notes 11–12. 
 21 See infra Part I. 
 22 See infra Section I.A. 
 23 See infra Section I.A. 
 24 See infra Sections I.C–I.D. 
 25 See infra Sections I.C–I.D. 
 26 See infra Sections I.C–I.D. 
 27 See infra Sections I.C–I.D. 
 28 See infra Section I.E. 
 29 See infra Section I.F. 
86 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  R E F L E C T I O N  [VOL. 96:2 
Then there are also viewpoint-based restrictions of speech, applied in 
particular institutional contexts, where the speech restriction seems to be 
intrinsic or essential to the functioning of the institution in accordance with 
its own vital basic purposes.30  In such cases, again, it is difficult to see any 
special “egregiousness,”31 much less any justification for any nearly absolute 
rule regarding viewpoint-based restrictions of speech. 
And finally on this bare, unelaborated typology, there are cases in which 
the viewpoint basis of the speech restriction seems clear, but the 
constitutional gravity of the restriction is debatable.  In these cases, the focus 
is not on institutional context as immediately above, but on the fundamental 
nature and character of the speech that is subject to regulation.  Viewpoint-
based regulation of pure commercial speech, with no pretense to any political 
or other social content, may fall into this category.32 
Below, we elaborate on and explore this typology of the forms and 
dimensions of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.  On this basis, we 
ultimately show that the nearly universal claim that viewpoint restrictions are 
uniquely dangerous, egregious, or damaging to the values of underlying 
freedom of speech is actually unjustified.  The idea of viewpoint-based 
restrictions in itself is, despite its familiarity, actually not a useful concept. 
I.   THE DIVERSE FORMS AND DIMENSIONS OF VIEWPOINT-BASED RESTRICTIONS 
ON SPEECH 
A.     The Most Egregious Cases 
The most egregious forms of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech 
involve either broad or narrow governmental attempts at dictatorial 
repression.  Among the purest examples would be the classic dystopian 
regime depicted in George Orwell’s 1984.33  The officially imposed language 
of Newspeak therein rendered “the expression of unorthodox opinions, 
above a very low level, . . . well-nigh impossible.”34  This broad, systematically 
engineered inarticulability, and indeed inconceivability, of disfavored ideas 
stands as the extreme case of viewpoint-based restriction of expression.  At a 
more personal level, 1984 depicts more dramatic specific forms of viewpoint 
repression, as in the classic colloquy between Inner Party member O’Brien 
and protagonist Winston Smith: 
 
O’Brien held up his left hand, its back toward Winston, with the 
thumb hidden and the four fingers extended. 
“How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?” 
 
 30 See infra Section I.G. 
 31 See supra text accompanying notes 4, 11, 12. 
 32 See infra Section I.H. 
 33 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Plume Books 2003) (1949). 
 34 Id. at 320. 
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“Four.” 
“And if the Party says that it is not four but five—then how many?” 
“Four.” 
The world ended in a gasp of pain.  The needle of the dial had shot 
up to fifty-five.35 
 
This incident, of course, illustrates the punishment and deterrence of 
expressing officially disfavored views, rather than the broad, systematic 
prevention of even entertaining any such views. 
Whatever laudable goals may once have motivated the Party, it is clear 
that at this point, the Party seeks primarily the deepening, extension, and 
security of its own power.  Free speech values such as the pursuit of truth36 are 
of no interest to the Party.  Rather than posing any sort of independent 
constraint on party doctrine, truth is now to be subject to the Party’s dictates.37 
Consider now some actual practices of former Soviet bloc regimes.  Even 
under the cynicism and careerism of the decaying Soviet bloc regimes, 
conformity to official viewpoint norms was broadly enforced.  The dissident 
and future Czech President Vaclav Havel thus reported that he lived “in a 
country where the authority and radioactive effect of words are demonstrated 
every day by the sanctions which free speech attracts.”38  The imprisoned 
Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky observed in turn that “Soviet citizens are 
divided by a host of invisible barriers that determine what they can read.”39  
Polish dissident Czeslaw Milosz added that the Soviet-style regimes prohibited 
“what has in every age been the writer’s essential task—to look at the world 
from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to 
keep watch . . . in the interest of society as a whole.”40 
Extreme forms of viewpoint-based speech repression have not gone 
unnoticed in American free speech jurisprudence.  Before the rise of modern 
totalitarian regimes, Justice Holmes classically observed that “[p]ersecution 
for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.  If you have no 
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition.”41  But the motives underlying viewpoint-based restrictions more 
 
 35 Id. at 257. 
 36 See, classically, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (Michael B. Mathias ed., 
Pearson Education 2007) (1859). 
 37 ORWELL, supra note 33, at 257. 
 38 Václav Havel, A Word About Words, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965–
1990, at 377, 379 (Paul Wilson ed., First Vintage Books 1992). 
 39 NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL 235 (Stefani Hoffman trans., 1998). 
 40 CZESLAW MILOSZ, THE CAPTIVE MIND, at xii (Jane Zielonko trans., Alfred A. Knopf 
ed., 1953) (1951). 
 41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (World 
War I–era subversive advocacy case).  See also the hypothetical case raised in R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992) (“[T]he government may proscribe [all] libel; but it 
may not make the further content [and viewpoint] discrimination of proscribing only libel 
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generally may be mixed, or only mildly objectionable, or even benign.  Mixed 
motives may be of all varieties.  This mixture of motives may be simple, or 
complex, again to any degree.  Motives may change, in any direction, over 
time.  And the malevolence, or benevolence, of any single government motive 
may again vary, to virtually any degree. 
B.     Mixed Motives with Different Degrees of Objectionability 
We see examples along the above spectra in the classic World War I–era 
subversive advocacy cases.42  Consider, for example, the mixture and the range 
of motivations for punishing acts of pamphleteering in Pierce v. United States.43  
In Pierce, the government criminally punished the distribution, in particular, 
of a pamphlet entitled “The Price We Pay.”44 
This pamphlet was broad-ranging as to the subjects and perspectives 
presented therein.45  Certainly, the speech-restricting government may have 
been motivated, at least in part, by the understandable purposes of 
discouraging inducement to “insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty 
in the military and naval forces of the United States.”46  Or so we can imagine, 
in the context of an assumedly just and vital war effort. 
Relatedly, the pamphlet in question was thought to promote 
“obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service,” and to seek to 
intentionally “interfere with the success of our military and naval forces in the 
war in which the United States was then engaged.”47  Again, assuming a legally 
defensible war effort, these potential motives may be entirely reasonable, 
given in particular the perceived need to maintain readiness against foreign 
military threats to the values underlying freedom of speech. 
The problem, for our purposes, is the likelihood of other motives, of one 
degree of causal importance or another, where those additional motives are 
less justifiable, in general or in light of the values underlying freedom of 
speech.  Thus the Supreme Court itself concluded in Pierce that the pamphlet 
“contained much in the way of denunciation of war in general, the pending 
war in particular, . . . [and an] assertion that under Socialism things would be 
better.”48 
 
critical of the government.”).  The Court apparently assumed an absolutist prohibition of 
at least this class of viewpoint-based regulations of speech, rather than referring merely to 
strict scrutiny, implicitly raising the possibility of mixed governmental motives in imposing 
viewpoint-based restrictions. 
 42 See, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, and 
in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (a Socialist presidential candidate convicted of 
subversive advocacy). 
 43 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
 44 See id. at 241–51. 
 45 See id. at 245, 249–50. 
 46 Id. at 249. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 245. 
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Clearly, a government attempt to suppress, generally or in a particular 
context, the view that socialism is preferable to some alterative, is no more 
constitutionally justifiable than an attempt to suppress the antithetical view, 
held by Winston Smith, that Orwell’s Ingsoc is objectionable.49 
In Pierce, however, the federal government objected as well to the 
defendant’s speech as allegedly calculated 
 
to arouse suspicion as to whether . . . the Government was not more 
concerned in enforcing the strictness of military discipline than in 
protecting the people against improper speculation in their food supply; 
and to produce a belief that our participation in war was the product of 
sordid and sinister motives, rather than a design to protect the interest and 
maintain the honor of the United States.50 
 
The Supreme Court majority in Pierce took these latter claims to be provably, 
if not knowingly, false, or “grossly false,”51 rather than as legitimate political 
arguments, of whatever strength or weakness.52 
Under the basic logic of freedom of speech, any speech that is not 
independently criminal and that expresses any view of the causes of the First 
World War should be constitutionally protected, whether the government 
agrees with any such viewpoint or not.53  The ultimate appeal in this and all 
free speech cases must crucially be to the fundamental reasons for specifically 
protecting speech in the first place.  These reasons refer to values or goals 
commonly thought to be promoted by a regime of freedom of speech.54  As a 
matter of consensus, these values or goals are said to include optimally 
advancing the pursuit of knowledge and truth;55 meaningful participation in 
 
 49 See generally ORWELL, supra note 33 (Ingsoc, or English Socialism, is the Party’s 
political ideology). 
 50 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 249–50. 
 51 See id. at 250–51. 
 52 As duly recognized by, unsurprisingly, Justices Brandeis and Holmes.  See id. at 267–
69 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 53 See in particular John Stuart Mill’s argument for the legal protection of political 
viewpoints widely judged to be partially, or even entirely, false.  See MILL, supra note 36, ch. 
2. 
 54 For standard typologies of free speech values, see, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:  A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY chs. 2–4 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130–47 (1989); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016.  See also, in our context, Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 (1996). 
 55 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 6; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 15; Greenawalt, supra 
note 54, at 130; Heins, supra note 54, at 100; William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for 
Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Free 
Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 232 
(2017); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 649, 657 (1987); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016, 1038. 
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democratic decisionmaking;56 promoting individual fulfillment or self-
realization;57 and reconciling the needs for both reasonable social stability 
and meaningful social change.58 
Examining Pierce and other sorts of viewpoint-based speech restrictions 
in light of these basic free speech values yields interesting results.59  As it turns 
out, viewpoint-based speech restriction cases are not reducible to a battle 
between the speaker’s, and others’, free speech interests on one side, and one 
or more nonspeech public interests, compelling or otherwise, on the other.  
In some cases of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech, the government is 
able to argue not only that the restriction promotes one or more public 
interests but, as well, that the viewpoint restriction, while impairing basic free 
speech values in some respects, also actually promotes one or more basic free 
speech values in other respects. 
Importantly, viewpoint-based restrictions on speech may indeed actually 
promote one or more basic free speech values, to widely varying degrees.  
These degrees may range from near zero, in the case of systematic Orwellian 
 
 56 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 6; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 35; Jack M. Balkin, 
Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053 (2016); Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1112–15 (2016); 
Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 145; Heins, supra note 54, at 100; Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016, 
1034; see also Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis For Viewpoint Neutrality: A 
Theory of Free Speech and Its Implications for the State Speech and Limited Public Forums Doctrine, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 603 (2013). 
 57 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 48; C. Edwin Baker, 
Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011); Susan J. Brison, The 
Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312 (1998); Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 143; 
Heins, supra note 54, at 100; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 591, 593 (1982); Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1016, 1028; see also MILL, supra note 36, ch. 
2. 
 58 See EMERSON, supra note 54, at 7; SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 35, 37; Greenawalt, 
supra note 54, at 142; Tsesis, supra note 54, at 1017, 1020; Heins, supra note 54, at 100. 
 59 Consider, e.g., what turns out to be the structurally similar viewpoint-based public-
school-compelled flag salute case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 627–29, 640 (1943).  In Barnette the viewpoint-based speech-burdening was arguably 
motivated, in part, by a disdain for purported “insubordination,” as well as by a desire, 
however ill-considered, for a sense of national unity against the military threat posed by the 
Nazi tyranny of Adolf Hitler.  See id.  On the one hand, a desire to suppress student 
“insubordination” of this sort is more damaging to than promotive of the basic purposes of 
freedom of speech.  In particular, the free speech value of promoting individual autonomy, 
development, and self-realization is clearly impaired.  See supra text accompanying note 57.  
But on the other hand, the desire for expressive solidarity against the immense Nazi threat, 
however possibly ill-considered, is clearly more compatible with essentially all of the basic 
free speech values.  See supra text accompanying notes 54–68.  Hitler’s Nazi regime could 
reasonably be seen as not merely a threat to American interests, as in a typical viewpoint-
based restriction case, but, in addition, as intentionally and directly antithetical specifically 
to all of the basic free speech values themselves. 
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government repression,60 to a significant degree, as in a hypothetical case of 
a viewpoint-based speech restriction intended to effectively turn the tide of 
battle against an invading Orwellian or Nazi61 regime.  It is certainly in the 
broad public interest that both the Orwellian and the Nazi regime takeovers 
be avoided.  But preventing Orwellian or Nazi tyranny also directly and 
substantially promotes, overall, each of the consensually basic free speech 
values.62  The regimes of 1984 and the Third Reich, indisputably, are 
essentially destructive of free speech values such as the optimal pursuit of 
truth,63 meaningful political democracy,64 and any recognizable conception 
of personal autonomy, self-realization, or human flourishing.65  And this effect 
is, crucially, a recurring matter of varying degrees among all viewpoint-based 
restrictions of speech. 
C.     Governmental Innocent Obliviousness Cases 
In other kinds of cases, the government may well fail to recognize or 
acknowledge, initially or at any later point, the viewpoint-basis and viewpoint 
effects of the speech regulation in question.  In the least controversial such 
cases, the government may not intend, or even recognize, the potential for 
viewpoint-based implementation of a speech regulation that seems viewpoint-
neutral on its face.  A typical such case, Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,66 
involved nearly unlimited administrative discretion to impose permit costs on 
potential speakers in any amount up to a specified maximum.67  As the Court 
held, “[n]othing in the law or its application prevents the official from 
encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary 
application of fees.”68  This degree of unconstrained, if formally neutral, 
discretion was held to have “the potential for becoming a means of 
suppressing a particular point of view.”69 
In this kind of case, bias in practical implementation may be conscious, 
or unconscious and unintended, or even nonexistent.  Thus such speech 
regulations may vary widely in their actual impact on speakers and on the basic 
free speech values.70  And more importantly, speech permitting schemes will 
not always track the largely unconstrained discretion in Forsyth.71  Many such 
 
 60 See supra text accompanying notes 33–37. 
 61 See supra note 59. 
 62 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 63 See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 64 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 56. 
 65 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 57. 
 66 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
 67 See id. at 130–34. 
 68 Id. at 133. 
 69 Id. at 130–31 (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 
U.S. 640, 649 (1981)). 
 70 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 71 See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130–34. 
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permitting schemes, for example, may require of the administrator some 
degree of evidence-based reasoning, or some reference to other constraining 
standards.  Thus, crucially, many such permitting schemes will pose lesser 
risks, to one degree or another, to the basic free speech values.72  No general 
presumption as to the degree of viewpoint-burdensomeness may thus be 
presumed in these kinds of cases. 
D.     Judicial-Level Viewpoint Obliviousness Cases 
In the obverse kinds of cases, it is crucially the courts themselves that fail 
to recognize, or acknowledge, an at least debatable potential of the 
government regulation for one degree or another of viewpoint-bias in 
application. 
Consider, for example, a recent federal appellate case involving 
corporate self-branding by using an ethnic slur as a trade name.73  Sensibly 
finding viewpoint-based speech discrimination in the Destito case,74 the 
Second Circuit therein also claimed that government disapproval of a 
message is “the essence of viewpoint discrimination”75 and, without much 
elaboration or explanation, that a regulation can somehow be viewpoint-
based even if it is an “across-the-board prohibition applicable to all speakers 
without regard to their intended messages.”76 
For our present purposes, though, the Destito case is interesting for its 
intriguing claim that Title VII restrictions on workplace speech do not count 
as viewpoint-based restrictions on speech because such regulations limit 
merely verbal conduct, rather than expression.77  Thus language that, under 
Title VII, may contribute to a hostile work environment may be 
constitutionally prohibited.78  Legal restriction of some workplace harassing 
speech may, in the court’s words, amount to “viewpoint disparity,” but as mere 
conduct regulation, does not also amount to viewpoint-based restriction of 
speech.79  At a minimum, then, the differences between viewpoint-based 
restrictions, subject to strict scrutiny if not to absolute prohibition,80 and the 
 
 72 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 73 Wandering Dago, Inc. v Destito, 879 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 74 See id. at 33. 
 75 Id. at 32 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 76 Id. at 33. 
 77 See id. at 32. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id.  For background, see, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) 
(commercial nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (public flag burning); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (public draft card burning case); Arnold H. 
Loewy, Distinguishing Speech From Conduct, 45 MERCER L. REV. 621 (1994); Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Speech Or Conduct: The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241 
(2015). 
 80 See supra text accompanying notes 12–13; Maura Douglas, Comment, Finding 
Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 738 (2018) 
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murky notion of mere “viewpoint disparity,”81 subject potentially to mere 
rationality review,82 must be somehow clarified. 
A separate attempt to distinguish “directed”83 from undirected,84 and 
supposedly thus much less objectionable,85 viewpoint-based speech 
restrictions is present in the artistic subsidy case of National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley.  In Finley, the federal artistic subsidy program required that grant 
applications be judged not only on the basis of artistic merit, but “taking into 
consideration general standards of decency” as well.86 
The Finley majority argued first that the “general standards of decency” 
consideration should not count as a viewpoint-based restriction on speech, in 
that the “decency” factor was not a classic prohibition of disfavored thought.87  
While free speech considerations can certainly arise in a government subsidy 
context,88 the “decency” criterion was not “the kind of directed viewpoint 
discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its 
face.”89  Speakers were not therein silenced.90  There was no express threat of 
the censorship of ideas.91  No “realistic danger [of a] compromise [of] First 
Amendment values” was thought to be present.92 
Not surprisingly, several of the Justices in Finley took issue with one or 
more of these claims.  Justice Scalia found that the “decency” consideration 
“unquestionably constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”93  That the viewpoint 
consideration did not amount to an absolute or blanket prohibition of 
applications deemed to be indecent went only to the reduced gravity of the 
viewpoint-based restriction. 94 
 
(“Despite the heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination, the Supreme Court has 
never made a per se rule on its (un)constitutionality.”). 
 81 See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 82 See generally Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex 
Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 288 (2011); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 30–32 (1972).  For more background, see the logic of the Court in the public employment 
case of New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592–593 (1979). 
 83 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583 (1998).  For commentary, 
see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content-Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 627 (2003). 
 84 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 583. 
 85 See id. at 587–88. 
 86 Id. at 572. 
 87 See id. at 583–88. 
 88 See id. at 587. 
 89 Id. at 583. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
 92 Id.  
 93 See id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“Giving offense is a viewpoint.”).  For commentary on Matal, see 
Calvert, supra note 12. 
 94 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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For Justice Scalia, though, this viewpoint-based restriction on speech in 
Finley was an “abridgement” of the freedom of speech in only a limited sense, 
and only to a limited and nearly inconsequential degree.95  Evidently, not all 
viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are created even roughly equal in 
constitutional significance.  Those persons who wish to create “indecent” art 
were, for Justice Scalia, just as free to do so as before.96  The only limit was that 
those who create “indecent” art were disadvantaged in applying for a federal 
government subsidy thereof.97 
A third view of the matter in Finley was taken by Justice Souter.98  Justice 
Souter declared that “[t]he decency . . . proviso mandates viewpoint-based 
decisions in the disbursement of Government subsidies.”99  Further, “the 
Government has wholly failed to explain why the statute should be afforded 
an exemption from the fundamental rule . . . that viewpoint discrimination in 
the exercise of public authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional.”100  
In defense of this approach, Justice Souter drew upon the classic caselaw 
apparently adopting an absolutist prohibition of viewpoint-based restrictions 
of speech.101 
The Finley case opinions, taken together, thus illustrate, along more than 
one dimension, the remarkable range of available judicial approaches to what 
is plausibly characterized as a viewpoint-based discrimination against speech.  
Again, our point is not to adjudicate among this range of approaches on the 
merits.  It is merely to record the judicial disputes in Finley as further evidence 
for the ordinarily unrecognized broad range of viewpoint-based restrictions 
on speech.  These crucial differences generally do not reflect differences in 
the weight of any public interests thought to justify the speech regulation in 
question.  Rather, these variations reflect important differences in the nature 
and gravity of the viewpoint-based restriction itself. 
E.     First- and Second-Order Viewpoint-Based Restrictions 
Equally important further complications arose in the foreign embassy 
protest case of Boos v. Barry.102  Boos nicely illustrates some of the problems 
that arise when an arguably viewpoint-based restriction on speech reflects not 
the actual, first-order, substantive beliefs of the restricting government itself, 
but that government’s attempt, for one reason or another, to politically 
 
 95 See id. at 595–96. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Id. at 600 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 99 Id.  See also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761–63 (2017).  For a critique, see 
Calvert, supra note 12.  
 100 Finley, 524 U.S. at 600–01, 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 101 Including Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), and Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 102 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
2021] V I E W P O I N T - B A S E D  R E G U L A T I O N S  O F  S P E E C H  95 
accommodate the speech-restrictive preferences of some other group, 
whether that group is politically powerful or not. 
Boos involved a local District of Columbia regulation that prohibited, in 
part, “the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign 
tends to bring a foreign government into ‘public odium’ or ‘public 
disrepute.’”103  Such a restriction might be considered viewpoint-neutral, in 
that neither the enacting government authority, nor any other party, can be 
certain in advance of the restriction’s actual political impact, in practice, years 
later.  Presumably, the enacting government need not really hold the view 
that no foreign government should ever be subjected to the relevant risk of 
public odium or disrepute.104  And this speech prohibition could be applied 
against demonstrations favored by the enacting government against a foreign 
government to which the enacting government vehemently objects. 
In this limited sense, the rule of Boos could be thought of as viewpoint-
neutral.  But in a broader sense, attention to viewpoint is crucial to the 
application of the regulation.  Any sign that is subject to the regulation would 
first have to be read, understood, and interpreted with regard to its message.  
And crucially, messages favorable to a particular government or policy would 
then be permitted, while critical messages tending to evoke odium or 
disrepute would not.105  The viewpoint of the demonstrator, the foreign 
government, and perhaps even of the United States would thus be directly 
implicated. 
Among the most interesting complications would be cases in which the 
rule-enacting government fully agrees with the message of the demonstrators 
but prohibits the demonstration pursuant to the regulation.  Such cases would 
be driven by the viewpoint-hostility not of the rule-enacting government, but 
of the foreign government subject to criticism, as merely accommodated, 
without sympathy on the merits, by the speech-restriction enacting 
government. 
This latter possibility illustrates the much broader phenomenon in 
which a regulating government adopts a viewpoint-based restriction not 
because of that government’s own first-order lack of sympathy with the speech 
 
 103 Boos, 485 U.S. at 315.  For commentary, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From 
Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 701 (1996) (“[T]he meaning of ‘viewpoint’ is ambiguous 
in this context.”). 
 104 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 315.  The Court in Boos held the restriction to be content-based, 
but not viewpoint-based, or at least not “directly” viewpoint based.  Id. at 319.  The 
regulation was held to distinguish among permitted and prohibited viewpoints “in a neutral 
fashion by looking to the policies of foreign governments.”  Id.  Query, though, whether we 
would also think of a heckler’s veto rule as viewpoint neutral if the permitted heckling met 
a similarly neutral criterion such as by looking to a current voting majority.  See generally 
Wright, supra note 8. 
 105 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 319.  It is certainly possible that some critical messages may not 
also be judged to tend to bring the targeted government into odium or disrepute.  Less 
realistically, a demonstration intended to support a government or its policy might backfire, 
and indeed tend to bring the foreign government into disrepute. 
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on the merits, but merely to accommodate the views of one or more 
nongovernmental groups that oppose the regulated speech on the merits.  
And there is no reason to believe that the groups thereby granted a sort of 
“veto” over the speech they disfavor will all be politically powerful. 
At least on some occasions, a regulating government might thus suppress 
speech to which it has no serious objection on the merits, mostly in order to 
accommodate a disadvantaged or stigmatized group.106  It is also possible that 
a government might restrict speech of a particular viewpoint, to which it has 
little objection, for the sake of some value such as social peace, community, 
or some form of equality.  This regulatory choice could politically mirror the 
interpersonal virtues of politeness, sensitivity, restraint, and tact. 
A viewpoint regulation motivated by such considerations might well then 
be properly judged on standards quite distinct from an absolute prohibition, 
or even strict scrutiny.  In the most innocently motivated cases, with the lowest 
potential for harm to the basic free speech values,107 some sort of alternative 
test, including judicial balancing or proportionality,108 if not a version of 
minimum scrutiny,109 might be called for. 
F.     The Importance of Any Disparities in the Value of Any Remaining Speech 
Channels 
A further crucial dimension along which viewpoint-based speech 
restrictions vary widely in their effects focuses on whether the regulated 
speakers have available to them one or more realistic alternative channels in 
which to convey the message in question, without any meaningful loss in the 
basic free speech values,110 as judged crucially by the regulated parties 
themselves.111  A viewpoint-based regulation that, for practical purposes, 
prevents the meaningful delivery of a disfavored message is one thing.  A 
viewpoint-based regulation that allows the regulated speaker equally good or 
better access, from their own free speech value standpoint, to alternative 
speech channels in which to convey their message, is quite another.  The latter 
 
 106 As well, there will be gradations among the cases in which the regulating 
government has mixed motives in adopting the viewpoint regulation.  The objectionability 
of such viewpoint-based speech restrictions may correspondingly vary. 
 107 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 108 For one elaborated version, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).  See also ROBERT ALEXY, A 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010 ed.) (2002).  For a 
broader legal perspective, see the essays collected in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, 
NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., 2017). 
 109 See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 110 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 111 This inquiry is utterly distinct from the more familiar examination of the 
“tailoring,” narrow or otherwise, of the actual scope a regulation to its intended purpose.  
See generally R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central 
Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 (1989). 
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sort of viewpoint-based restriction on speech is, almost by definition, 
constitutionally nearly harmless. 
Imagine, for example, a viewpoint-based rule that prevents conservative 
Republican billionaires, but not progressive Democrat billionaires, from 
promoting their political candidacy through cardboard signs attached to 
telephone poles.  Regardless of how such a rule might be enforced, its effect 
on any regulated party’s speech, or on the rights of any voter who wishes to 
hear the candidate’s message, could well be trivial, if not actually slightly 
favorable.  Any affected party would still have equal or better ways, from their 
own free speech values standpoint, of communicating the ideas in question.112  
The overall free speech value loss could be minimal, nonexistent, or even 
slightly negative. 
We see recognizable suggestions of this possibility in some familiar 
caselaw.  Consider for instance, the well-known flag burning protest case of 
Texas v. Johnson.113  The majority in Johnson explained that “Johnson was 
prosecuted because he knew that his politically charged expression would 
cause ‘serious offense.’”114  After all, the State of Texas had no objections to 
the idea of safely and environmentally responsibly burning an American flag.  
Burning an American flag is recognized as an appropriate method of disposal 
thereof.115  It is only when burning the flag amounts to desecration, as in 
sending a message of contempt or disdain, that such an act is criminalized.116 
This clearly amounts to a form of viewpoint-based discrimination against 
one category of symbolic speech.  Perhaps the most relevant viewpoint-
responder is the Texas state government, or more crucially, the segment of 
the Texas population that would take “serious offense” to politically 
motivated flag desecration.  It is possible that the Texas state officials 
themselves had no serious objection to politicized flag burning, but felt that 
popular sentiment, or some segment thereof, left them no choice. 
The main dissenting opinion in Johnson, though, raises a crucial concern.  
The defendant Johnson had also engaged in a number of more conspicuous 
public protest events and activities at the Republican National Convention.117  
These activities included leading marches and protests, engaging in a “die-
in,” and protest chanting.118 
Whether any of these other protest events by Johnson had any causal role 
in motivating his flag-burning arrest may be unclear.  But as the main 
 
 112 Consider, merely for example, the continuing availability of televised debates, 
dedicated websites, various social media, as well as paid radio and television time. 
 113 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 114 Id. at 411. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 118 See id. 
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dissenting opinion points out, Johnson was not criminally charged with any 
of the above contemporaneous and similarly-themed protest activities.119 
The main dissent then argues, interestingly, that the fact that Texas 
allowed Johnson to engage in various sorts of similar, perhaps even more 
articulate, forms of dramatic protest bears significantly upon the extent and 
degree to which Johnson’s free speech rights, given his own basic free speech 
value priorities, were really inhibited.120  Hence the dissenters’ argument in 
Johnson that “[f]ar from being a case of ‘one picture being worth a thousand 
words,’ flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that . . . 
is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to 
antagonize others.”121 
Thus the main dissenting opinion looked to the viewpoint-based speech 
restriction’s actual effects on Johnson’s ability to authentically and effectively 
express his political message.  The conclusion was that the relevant “statute 
deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest . . . 
and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form 
of verbal expression to express his deep122 disapproval of national policy.”123  
Johnson was thought to have expressed “nothing that could not have been 
conveyed . . . just as forcefully in a dozen different ways.”124 
The dissenting opinion in question thus focused on the availability, or 
not, of one or more alternative speech channels remaining available to 
Johnson, ideally with a deferential acknowledgement of Johnson’s own 
speech priorities as to, for example, intensity versus articulateness, size and 
selection of audience, public visibility, and financial costs, along with any 
other relevant consideration.125 
The crucial point is that some persons whose speech is somehow limited 
on the basis of viewpoint may still have available to them alternative speech 
channels that are just as good, in terms of their own priorities among free 
speech values, and other such speakers may not.  This sort of free speech 
impairment is a matter of varying degrees and dimensions in different cases. 
In general, viewpoint-based speech restrictions that leave the speaker 
essentially unimpaired in disseminating their message are dramatically 
different in nature and consequences from viewpoint-based restrictions that 
largely, if not entirely, prevent the speaker from presenting anything like the 
targeted message in any forum. 
 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. at 432.  We may assume that a desire purely to antagonize other persons, even 
in a political context, is at best only poorly related to the basic free speech values.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 122 Or at least, emotionally intense.  For an emphasis on the constitutional value of 
what the Court refers to as “emotive” speech, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 123 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. at 431. 
 125 See generally Wright, supra note 111. 
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We can understand why viewpoint-based restrictions might evoke strict 
scrutiny, if not an absolute prohibition, in the latter, more serious kinds of 
cases.126  But it is far less clear why a viewpoint-based restriction that has only 
a negligible or even a net favorable effect on the free speech values of the 
affected parties should be tested by any rigorous judicial standard.127 
A further illustration of this theme is the controversial Indianapolis 
pornography ordinance case of American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.128  In this 
case, Judge Frank Easterbrook began with the assertion that “[u]nder the First 
Amendment the government must leave to the people the evaluation of 
ideas.”129  Judge Easterbrook then noted that the Indianapolis ordinance 
purported to regulate not all graphic sexually explicit depictions of women, 
but only those depictions that involved the “subordination” of women.130 
The ordinance thus, in that sense, established an officially approved view 
of women.131  And according to Judge Easterbrook, those who adopt the 
approved view may use graphic, sexually explicit depictions of women in their 
communications, while those who do not adopt that approved view may not.132  
On this basis, Judge Easterbrook then struck down this viewpoint-based 
speech regulation,133 even while explicitly assuming, at least hypothetically, 
the existence of a compelling governmental interest in preventing serious 
harms to women,134 and while recognizing that counter-speech is not a 
meaningful response to a harmful pornographic image.135 
Rather than at least hypothetically sacrifice the compelling interest of 
women in not being physically assaulted for the sake of avoiding a particular 
viewpoint-based speech restriction, we would do well to consider the rule’s 
actual impact on freedom of speech.136 
Suppose we assume, perhaps controversially,137 that a potential 
pornographic speaker in this American Booksellers case intended to convey 
some constitutionally sufficient idea within the scope of coverage of the Free 
Speech Clause. 138  This idea would of course have to be conveyable by means 
 
 126 This point assumes that the weight of any state interest in restricting the expression 
of a viewpoint can be set temporarily aside for purposes of doing the crucial alternative 
speech channels analysis. 
 127 See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 128 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.). 
 129 Id. at 327. 
 130 See id. at 328–329. 
 131 See id. at 328, 332. 
 132 See id. at 328. 
 133 See id. at 334. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. at 330. 
 136 See supra text accompanying notes 122–27. 
 137 See generally R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining 
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
 138 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 54, at 89–92 (drawing a distinction between the range 
or scope of protection of speech and the degree or intensity of any protection of covered 
speech). 
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of the graphic, sexually explicit depiction of the subordination of women.139  
Otherwise, it would not be subject to the ordinance in question.140 
But then, the vital question becomes: What idea can be conveyed only 
through the graphic, sexually explicit depiction of the subordination of 
women, and, crucially, by no other means?  Why, to begin, must the assumed 
idea be conveyed graphically?  And sexually explicitly?  And through whatever 
counts as a depiction?  Why wouldn’t some even slight departure from this 
combination of characteristics allow the speaker to convey the relevant 
message while preserving that speaker’s free speech priorities as to 
communication? 
It may well be that the specific form of pornography restricted by the 
Indianapolis ordinance was, for some restricted speaker, the most financially 
lucrative available business opportunity.  But we are not constitutionally 
concerned with the overall state of mind of the speaker, or with their income 
level, apart from their priorities with respect, precisely, to the free speech 
values promoted by the expression of some minimally sufficient idea.  
Maximizing profits need not be the same thing as, or require, maximizing the 
free speech values associated with expressing some particular message.  It is 
at best unclear what particular message must, in practice, be conveyed in a 
manner that violates the narrow Indianapolis ordinance, and not essentially 
equally well, or better, by some other, legally permitted means. 
But now let us assume that any other remaining alternative way of 
conveying the speaker’s idea must, to at least some minimal degree, distort or 
otherwise impair the speaker’s message.  If we are still, with Judge 
Easterbrook, assuming the existence of a compelling government interest 
underlying the ordinance, we must then ask a further question: Is any minimal 
loss in overall free speech values attributable to this narrow ordinance worth 
anything remotely like the assumed resulting increase in violent attacks upon 
women?141 
That is, why couldn’t a hypothetical minimal loss in free speech values 
be balanced against, and grossly outweighed by, any degree of an assumed 
resulting reduction in violent attacks against innocent victims?  This is a 
matter of judgment at the margins,142 and not at all a matter of entirely 
abolishing all freedom of speech, in some specific context, for some payoff.143 
The broader point is, again, that not all viewpoint-based restrictions of 
speech are anywhere near equally “egregious.”144  Some viewpoint-based 
speech restrictions, as in American Booksellers, are not egregious at all because 
 
 139 See American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 328. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. at 329. 
 142 See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS bk. V, ch. VIII (8th ed. 
1920) (1890) (discussing the economic principle of decisionmaking on the margin). 
 143 Given the uncertainties on both sides of this kind of balancing, we could adopt any 
presumption, or make any adjustment to the weighing process, we thought appropriate. 
 144 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
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they only narrowly and minimally impact speech,145 even if we ignore any 
compelling interests they might also promote. 
G.     Viewpoint Discrimination as Crucial to Essential Institutional Functioning 
But the sorts of cases noted immediately above are merely another 
category of viewpoint-based restrictions of speech in which the severity of the 
restriction is either quite variable, or else commonly minimal.  As a distinct 
further category, consider the cases in which it might plausibly be claimed 
that some viewpoint-based restrictions of speech are not merely slightly 
favorable to overall free speech values, but are essential to the functioning of 
what we take to be an indispensable public institution.  In particular, consider 
the problem of viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech in public 
schools.146 
The judicial test applied in public school speech regulation cases may 
depend upon whether the school administration is clearly speaking on its own 
behalf;147 whether a student is speaking with the apparent approval of the 
school;148 or whether the student is clearly speaking on her own behalf.149 
Among the cases considering a possible role for viewpoint-based 
restrictions of speech attributable solely to a student is the “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” banner display case of Morse v. Frederick.150  In Morse, Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for a plurality, held that public “schools may take steps to 
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”151  Chief Justice Roberts explained 
 
 145 But see American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330 (expressing an ultimate fear of 
government as “in control of all the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of 
which thoughts are good for us”). 
 146 See generally, e.g., Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a 
Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 217 (2004); 
Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the 
Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (2007); Alexis Zouhary, 
The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for Applying Viewpoint Neutrality to Student 
Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2227 (2008). 
 147 See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 695 (2011); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Note, Three’s a Crowd—Defending the Binary 
Approach to Government Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2011). 
 148 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (leaving unclear 
whether viewpoint-based restrictions in such cases must be not only legitimate and 
reasonable, but viewpoint-neutral as well). 
 149 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black arm 
band protest of the Vietnam War); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (vulgar 
speech by student at a student election assembly). 
 150 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 151 Id. 
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that “deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps 
compelling’ interest.”152 
Let us assume that Mr. Frederick’s displaying the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” 
banner involved expression of a message sufficiently coherent to fall within 
the scope of First Amendment coverage.153  The question then becomes 
whether the speech restriction at issue was recognizably viewpoint-based.  And 
the answer seems clear.  A banner that called for discussion of the possible 
harms of illegal drug use among public high school students would not have 
been censored, and certainly would not have fallen within the logic of Chief 
Justice Roberts’s reasoning.154  A banner that was perceived as, in whatever 
respect, critical of such illegal drug use would clearly not have been 
censored.155 
Thus the dissenting opinion in Morse argued “the Court does serious 
violence to the First Amendment in upholding—indeed, lauding—a school’s 
decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed.”156  At 
the most general level, any rule that permits the expression of message “A,” 
while prohibiting the otherwise similarly situated expression of message “not-
A,” should be presumed to be based, in one way or another, on viewpoint. 
Yet the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, in the case of a 
viewpoint-based speech restriction, referred to either a compelling or to a 
merely “important” governmental interest, without engaging in any especially 
rigorous investigation of causation or any narrowness of tailoring.157 
This judicial laxity of Chief Justice Roberts in the face of a viewpoint-
based restriction of speech is best explained by emphasizing the public school 
educational context,158 its “special characteristics,”159 and the presumed vital 
public functions of the essential institution of the public-school system.  Public 
schools, at least at certain grade levels, are not intended to serve as indoor 
public fora, as debating societies, or even as the site of general and open 
discussion groups.  Such schools have other, typically imperfectly achieved, 
purposes. 
 
 152 Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
 153 See supra text accompanying notes 137–38.  Certainly, one could reasonably argue 
to the contrary.  See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 433, 434–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The banner 
in question was raised on a public sidewalk, and thus in a traditional public forum, but in 
the course of an official school function.  See id. at 400–01 (majority opinion). 
 154 See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 155 See id.  Had a banner critical of drug use been lewd, indecent, or vulgar in 
expression, the case might then fall under the rule espoused in Bethel School District v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 156 Morse, 551 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Justices Alito and 
Kennedy attempted to draw a viable distinction between the unprotected advocacy of illegal 
drug use and protected commentary “on any political or social issue,” including drug-
related issues.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 157 See supra text accompanying note 155. 
 158 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
 159 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
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In some small measure, the mission of the public schools as an institution 
involves both educating about and appropriately discouraging the use by 
students of illegal drugs.160  Much more broadly, and much more essentially, 
the public schools as an indispensable institution exist to promote the 
transmission of both a broad range of knowledge and basic cultural values 
including sufficient civility, mutual respect, a recognition of basic equality 
among persons, and reciprocal recognition and tolerance.161  And these basic 
cultural values are, not at all surprisingly, linked to the promotion of the 
fundamental free speech values themselves,162 including the optimal pursuit 
of truth, an effectively functioning democratic self-government, and the 
opportunity for optimal self-realization.163 
These essential institutional purposes of the public school system largely 
explain why clearly viewpoint-based restrictions on speech in public schools 
may evoke something short of traditional strict scrutiny, much less any 
absolute prohibition.164  In some such cases, courts may recognize that the 
viewpoint-neutrality requirement normally applied elsewhere, even to so-
called nonpublic fora, may not be appropriate for pure student speech 
contexts, given the schools’ institutional purposes and values.165 
 
 160 See id. at 407–08. 
 161 See, crucially, the logic of the fundamental public school desegregation case of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 683 (1986).  More theoretically, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 
19–20 (Dover ed. 2004) (1916).  In the context of arguably officially endorsed student 
speech, see Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988).  For the case 
of a public school library book removal, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879–80 
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 162 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683–85; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–72.  Notice, relatedly, how 
restrictions on the display in public schools of Confederate flags are typically upheld on 
grounds of reasonably anticipated disorder, where the free speech values of the “targets” 
or victims of Confederate flag display could also be implicated as well.  See, e.g., Hardwick 
ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2013); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 
674 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2011) (Boggs, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); 
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir 2009); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 
Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 736–38 (8th Cir. 2009); Barr v. Lafon, 553 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 
2009).  Or more broadly, consider the Title VII workplace treatment of the display of 
Confederate flags, as distinct from flags conveying other messages, as in Ellis v. CCA of 
Tennessee, LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]isplays of confederate flags in the 
workplace may support a hostile work environment claim.”); Watson v. CEVA Logistics US, 
Inc., 619 F.3d 936, 938–39 (8th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir. 
2009); Renfroe v. IAC Greencastle, LLC, 385 F. Supp. 3d 692, 704 (S.D. Ind. 2019). 
 164 See supra text accompanying notes 3–5, 11, 13. 
 165 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (allowing the removal of public school library books judged 
to be “pervasively vulgar” or “educational[ly] [un]suitab[le]”).  Inescapably, these 
judgments must involve reflection not only on the content of the books, but on the 
worthiness of the ideas, messages, or views expressed therein.  But see id. at 872 (arguing to 
the contrary).  See also Walker v. Tex. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2251 (2015) (brief survey of the evolving forms of public fora); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
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H.     Viewpoint Discrimination Against Speech Categories of Lesser Constitutional 
Significance 
In yet another class of viewpoint-based restriction cases, courts may shy 
away from forthrightly adopting either strict scrutiny or speech-protective 
absolutism because of a judicial sense, whether universally shared or not, that 
the very nature of the general type or category of the speech itself is of only 
diminished constitutional significance. 
Consider, for example, the otherwise puzzling commercial speech case 
of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.166  Sorrell involved Vermont’s restrictions on the 
disclosure of pharmacy records that would indicate the drug prescription 
practices of particular physicians, which would clearly be of commercial 
interest to parties seeking to increase their market share of prescription drug 
sales.167 
The Court in Sorrell indicated that the speech restriction in question 
disfavored some speech based on viewpoint.168  In particular, the restriction 
burdened those who would use the information obtained for commercial, but 
not for educational, speech purposes.169  Crucially, the Court held that the 
Vermont law “on its face burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers,”170 thus 
amounting not only to content-discrimination, but as well to viewpoint-based 
discrimination.171 
If viewpoint-based speech discrimination were uniformly abhorrent or 
egregious,172 one might well expect the Court in Sorrell to have said so, and 
then tested the relevant statute by strict scrutiny, if not by an absolutist 
standard.  But this is not how the Court in Sorrell in fact proceeded.  Instead, 
the Court concluded merely that the speech regulation at issue would 
supposedly fail a range of elevated, or heightened, degrees of judicial 
scrutiny.173  The particular degree of elevated scrutiny applied was thus 
irrelevant, and therefore need not be specified. 174  The dissenters in the case, 
interestingly, would not have applied any form of elevated judicial scrutiny, 
and would have upheld the state regulation of speech.175 
 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992) (rejecting viewpoint-based, but not 
all content-based, speech restrictions in nonpublic fora). 
 166 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 167 See id. at 557–58. 
 168 See id. at 563–64. 
 169 See id. at 564.  Of course, if one declines to view this sort of speech restriction as in 
any sense based on viewpoint, that would further complicate the logic of the scope and 
defensibility of the law of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech. 
 170 Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 171 See id. at 565, 571. 
 172 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
 173 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557, 571–80. 
 174 See id. at 571 (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 184 (1999)). 
 175 See id. at 580–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The Court’s carefully specified reluctance in Sorrell to clearly and 
explicitly subject the viewpoint regulation in question to the most rigorous 
forms of judicial scrutiny stems, certainly, from a judicial reluctance to decide 
what need not presently be decided.  But it stems as well from a widely, but 
not universally, shared sense that even nonmisleading, nonfraudulent 
commercial speech, without any inseparable elements of political speech, is 
generally unworthy of the same level of constitutional protection as core 
political speech,176 even where viewpoint-based restriction of such purely 
commercial messages is present.177 
Whether freedom of pure and nonmisleading commercial speech, as a 
category, tends to promote the basic free speech values178 of pursuing the 
truth, democratic self-government, and self-realization as much as freedom of 
political speech is vigorously debated.179  To the extent that some courts, in 
some contexts, perceive differences between the free speech value of 
commercial and of political speech, viewpoint-based restrictions of pure 
commercial speech may understandably be tested in less than rigorous 
fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is widely taken for granted that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech 
are, as a class, especially disfavored, meriting either absolute prohibition or 
strict scrutiny.  As it turns out, however, this common assumption is both 
descriptively incorrect and normatively unjustifiable. 
A typology of the various basic forms of viewpoint-based restriction on 
speech supports this initially surprising claim.  This typology can be 
constructed out of the obvious uncertainties, ambiguities, equivocations, and 
gaps found in the viewpoint-restriction cases. 
There are, certainly, genuinely egregious cases of viewpoint-based 
restrictions.  But these cases do not begin to exhaust the range of the 
possibilities.  There are also mixed-motive viewpoint-based restriction cases, 
where the governmental motives, apart from the weight of any governmental 
interest, may vary widely in their degree of objectionability.  In other cases, 
the government enacting the viewpoint-based restriction may be more or less 
unaware of the viewpoint-based effects of the speech restriction in question.  
 
 176 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–
63 (1984) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). 
 177 See supra text accompanying notes 168–71.  Whether discrimination against 
speakers who use the data for commercial speech purposes, as compared to other speakers 
who use that same data for noncommercial purposes, should be classified as viewpoint-
based discrimination is debatable. 
 178 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 179 For a sense of the relevant arguments, see, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 79–93 (2016); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment 
and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981 (2009).  For background, see the arguments in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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Sometimes it is the courts themselves that are oblivious to the viewpoint-based 
effects of the regulation in question.  In a further class of cases, the viewpoint-
based restriction does not at all reflect the enacting government’s own first-
order substantive preferences on the merits.  Instead, the enacting 
government is expressing only its own second-order preferences, not on the 
merits, but as among the various groups who may or may not favor the speech 
restriction, in general or on a specific occasion.  The enacting government 
may in such cases be accommodating groups, large or small, or else generally 
politically weak and disenfranchised, or relatively powerful. 
As well, viewpoint-based restrictions of speech may well not leave the 
regulated speakers and audiences in any meaningfully worse position with 
respect to anyone’s own authentic basic free speech values and priorities.  In 
such cases, the regulated speakers may be unaffected, or even better off, in 
terms of their own free speech values, because the speakers still have available 
alternative speech channels through which to convey their message as well, as 
before. 
And in yet other viewpoint-based restriction cases, the crucial 
complication is again not the weight of the government interest at stake, but 
an understandable reluctance to impose strict scrutiny, much less an absolute 
prohibition, on the speech regulation in question.  Public schools, for 
example, collectively qualify as social institutions that, by their very nature, 
purposes, and functions, properly resist the broad application of strict 
scrutiny to viewpoint-based restrictions of much student speech. 
Finally, there are cases in which the general category or class of speech 
in question is thought by many, but certainly not all, to implicate less strongly, 
if at all, the basic values and purposes underlying the idea of special legal 
protection for speech.  At least some instances of even nonmisleading pure 
commercial speech are often thought to fall in this category.  And on this 
assumption, it is not surprising that even viewpoint-based restrictions on the 
category of speech in question do not evoke strict scrutiny, let alone an 
absolute prohibition of such regulations.  
In general, then, we may say that viewpoint-based restrictions of speech 
can and should, depending on type and context, evoke any number of cheers 
from between zero and three. 
